Meanwhile, the danger mounts as the world's capacity to produce vaccines shrinks and avian H5N1 influenza, which has infected many people and killed at least 44 to date, continues to circulate in Southeast Asia. 4 With the H5N1 virus showing progressive genetic changes as it has adapted to new avian hosts in recent years and is now circulating at or near endemic levels in poultry in many parts of Asia, the pervasive threat of a pandemic outbreak in humans grows larger and more imminent.
A summary was recently prepared for the Forum on Microbial Threats of the Institute of Medicine, entitled The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready?, based on discussions and presentations at a 2-day workshop convened in June 2004 by the Forum. It includes papers from leading experts that explore the history of influenza pandemics and its lessons along with the 2003-04 outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Asia and its implications for human health. It chronicles the emergence and toll of the H5N1 avian influenza strain and its appearance in mammals, including humans, and compares the costs of preparations with the costs of illness and death that could arise during an outbreak. It describes what steps the United States and other countries have taken thus far to prepare for a pandemic flu outbreak and discusses unmet needs, including the inability of hospitals to absorb the expected surge of critically ill patients and the gaps existing in many nations' capacities to monitor and detect flu outbreaks among animals or people. The summary points to the need for international agreements regarding the sharing of influenza vaccine and antiviral stockpiles to ensure that the 88 percent of nations that cannot manufacture or stockpile these products have access to them.
Several recurring themes emerged during the workshop. The assessments put forward by individual experts are included in the report. Echoing throughout the discussions of the question "Are we ready for a pandemic influenza?" was the answer: "no." The unmet needs, gaps in knowledge, and opportunities not yet taken for improving preparedness that suggest such a conclusion are described here in brief.
ADDRESSING UNMET NEEDS

Gaps in Global Surveillance
Many countries lack infectious disease surveillance capabilities. Disturbingly, some of the most glaring gaps in surveillance occur in Asia, where H5N1 avian influenza has infected and killed scores of people since 1997. Developed countries' interests would be well served by funding improved influenza surveillance in such influenza "hot spots." In addition to increasing surveillance capacity, replacing the present economic disincentives to early reporting of disease with incentives for surveillance, timely disease detection, and access to vaccines and antivirals will greatly increase the chances of recognizing and containing an emerging pandemic strain before or soon after it emerges.
In the United States, data on severe illness and death 
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71 from influenza are also inadequate. Improved data would more effectively inform decisions related to priorities for prevention and treatment that need to be made at the local, state, regional, and national levels (e.g., immunization and preparedness planning). Improved real-time surveillance and disease reporting could provide critically important early warnings for an emerging pandemic outbreak.
5-11
Integration of Animal and Public Health Communities
Influenza surveillance, research, and pandemic response planning should reflect the zoonotic nature of the disease. Improved communication and the development of stronger professional relationships between veterinary and medical researchers and agriculture and public health officials would encourage a greater appreciation in both communities for the implications of animal diseases for the health of human populations, and for human practices that promote or prevent zoonoses. The current lack of integrated funding for influenza surveillance within both the animal and human populations works against such integration. Better coordination between public and private funders of research and disease surveillance will be necessary.
10-15
Disincentives for Preemptive Culling of Animals
As with surveillance, global public health interests are solved by encouraging farmers (or even entire countries) to curtail or prevent a human pandemic by sacrificing their poultry or livestock. A variety of options should be explored to support this outcome in different settings, from individual farmers in low-resource settings to industrial poultry and livestock producers in wealthy countries, both of whom face economic disincentives to reporting and culling infected poultry and livestock. 5, 9, 11, 16 
Rapid, Inexpensive Influenza Diagnostics
Cheap, simple diagnostic tests would improve influenza surveillance in animals and humans. Reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing is the best current option, but the international veterinary community has yet to adopt RT-PCR. As a result, culling at the first farm was delayed 4 days in the recent H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands as officials waited for virus isolation results. Use of improved diagnostics for influenza also will promote more prudent and effective use of both vaccines and antiviral drugs. 11, 13, 15, 17 
Market Demand for Annual Influenza Immunization and Antiviral Therapy and Prophylaxis
Demand for influenza vaccine drives supply. After last year's severe flu season and this year's unanticipated vaccine shortages in the U.S., the public may respond well to efforts to promote immunization, including perhaps a campaign that introduces the hazards of pandemic influenza. It will be important to include in that message the distinction between the protective effect of an annual influenza vaccine and the additional immunization that would be necessary to protect against a pandemic strain. Increased usage of vaccine during interpandemic periods is likely to increase the supply of vaccine available in a pandemic emergency by promoting the development of greater manufacturing capacity. A similar argument can be made for increasing interpandemic demand for antiviral drugs, which to date has been low. The greater the interpandemic use of antivirals, the greater the production and the greater availability of these drugs during an outbreak situation. Moreover, increasing physician experience with, and public awareness of, antiviral medications should reinforce their effective use in responding to a pandemic.
7,18-21
International Stockpiles of Antiviral Drugs and Vaccines
Dedicated supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs are necessary for a rapid response to the first cases of a potential pandemic influenza strain (e.g., through ring immunization, targeted age-specific immunization strategies, and/or targeted antiviral prophylaxis). This plan would probably require a smaller investment, and could offer greater benefit in relation to cost, than the aforementioned strategy of compensating farmers for preemptive culling of poultry or livestock in areas affected by avian influenza. However, this strategy is unlikely to work unless an international agreement to create and manage such stockpiles is in place when the next pandemic arrives; otherwise, stockpiles and production of vaccines and antiviral drugs will almost certainly be nationalized.
Additionally, antiviral stockpiles need to be placed at strategically located sites representing high-volume points of care (e.g., outpatient clinics, emergency rooms, occupational health sites, student health facilities, nursing homes, pharmacies) for rapid distribution without requiring a visit to a physician for an effective pandemic response. If stockpiles of vaccines are to be developed and relied on, it is clear that the range of factors contributing to the recent crises in seasonal influenza vaccine production and deployment will need to be overcome. 7, 10, 18, 20, 22 
Advance Development of Protocols for Research During a Pandemic
When the next influenza pandemic emerges, it will be essential to rapidly gain a greater understanding of the clinical, epidemiological, and biological nature of the new strain of influenza. This will be possible only if research protocols and the laboratory networks to pursue them are established before a pandemic strikes. As Klaus Stöhr of WHO observed, "We have to invest more into planning research, into having protocols ready and having networks of scientists in place and eager to contribute before the next pandemic virus emerges." For example, protocols to estimate vaccine efficacy could be implemented immediately upon the commencement of immunization in response to a pandemic, and they could even be conducted during the annual flu season.
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GOALS FOR RESEARCH
Determine the Molecular Basis of Influenza Pathogenesis
Much remains to be understood about the molecular basis of influenza pathogenesis, host immune response, immune protection, immune enhancement, virulence, and transmissibility. H5N1 variants provide an opportunity to study all of these phenomena. Breakthroughs in these areas of scientific understanding could rapidly lead to more effective and more easily produced countermeasures to an influenza pandemic.
11,24
Predict Pandemic Potential of Influenza Isolates
As we gain knowledge of the molecular pathogenesis of influenza, it should become possible to predict the threat posed by a particular strain by analyzing key sequences in its genome. While there has been one probable case of human-to-human transmission to date, 25 the fact that H5N1 has not yet accomplished efficient human-to-human transmission begs the question, "Why not?" Risk assessment tools based on influenza viral genomics may one day provide an answer-and perhaps prevent the unnecessary culling of poultry or livestock following outbreaks of avian influenza.
11,24
Increase the Efficacy of Influenza Vaccines and the Efficiency of Their Production
Limited supplies of vaccine could go further if their antigen content were adjusted to provide the lowest effective dose to each recipient, and if they could be safely made more immunogenic with the addition of an adjuvant. Fortunately, promising new methods for boosting antigen yields in egg-based vaccine systems, coupled with adjuvants and delivery devices to enhance vaccine supply and performance, could increase vaccine availability in the near term. 10, 20 The possible replacement of egg-based viral propagation with mammalian cell culture methods may lead to more rapid vaccine production in the far term. Most recently, the use of reverse geneticsthe cloning of hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes and their expression in a recombinant virus in cell culture-has supplied the seed strain for the H5N1 vaccine currently in clinical trials. 7, 19, 26 
SUMMARY
The potential for a catastrophic influenza pandemic is very real, but that potential has been evident and largely ignored for decades. The power of vaccines to prevent morbidity and mortality associated with influenza is well proven, but the current technology limits the capacity to produce vaccines-as recent events confirm. In the event of a pandemic, vaccines would be out of reach of the vast majority of the global population. If the initial cases of an emerging human influenza strain were to be detected, and if antiviral drugs were quickly administered to close contacts of index cases, transmission might be significantly affected-but those are big "ifs" in a world where early reporting of influenza carries dire economic consequences and where nations are likely to nationalize stockpiles and production of antiviral drugs and vaccines in response to a near-term pandemic threat. Moreover, influenza infections are very different from SARS and will not likely be brought under control by quarantine or other simple measures. What should be done to prevent the loss of millions of lives, and the evidence for doing it, is quite clear. What remains uncertain is the political will to support such efforts before the next pandemic renders them futile.
